I. Introduction
Political opposition to "globalization" has grown rapidly during the last few years.
Protesters in Seattle, Washington D.C. and other cities around the world have rallied against the alleged evils of an increasingly interconnected world economy, and of the socalled "Washington Consensus."
The opening of domestic capital markets to foreigners is, perhaps, the most reviled aspect of this "consensus." In rejecting a higher degree of capital mobility across countries, the anti-globalization activists and protesters are not alone. Indeed, a number of academics have argued that the free(er) mobility of private capital during the 1990s was behind the succession of crises that the emerging markets experienced during that decade. According to this view, increased capital mobility inflicts many costs and generates (very) limited benefits to the emerging nations. It has been argued that, since emerging markets lack modern financial institutions, they are particularly vulnerable to the volatility of global financial markets. This vulnerability, the story goes, will be higher in countries with a more open capital account. Moreover, many global-skeptics have argued that there is no evidence supporting the view that a higher degree of capital mobility has a positive impact on economic growth in the emerging economies (Rodrik 1998) .
Surprisingly, the debate on the effects of capital mobility on economic performance has been characterized by a very limited number of empirical analyses. Some exceptions are Rodrik (1998) , Klein and Olivei (1999) , Quinn (1997) and Reisen and Soto (2000) .
The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically the relationship between economic performance and capital mobility in the world economy. I am particularly interested in understanding two related issues: First, is there any evidence, at the cross country level, that higher capital mobility is associated (after controlling for other factors) with higher growth? And, second, is the relationship between capital mobility and growth different for emerging and advanced countries? The paper is organized as follows: Section I is the introduction. In section II I provide an analysis of the magnitude, importance, composition and other characteristics of capital flows in the world economy between 1975and 1997. In section III I deal with measurement problems. I argue that the complications associate to the measurement the actual, as opposed to legal, degree of capital mobility makes the analysis of the connection between capital mobility and growth particularly difficult. In this section I discuss the properties of various measures on the degree of capital mobility recently constructed by a number of analysts. In section IV I report the results from a series of cross-country regressions on economic performance. I focus on two independent variables -GDP growth, and total factor productivity growth -and I control for the standard variables, including human capital and the initial degree of economic development. Finally, section IV is the conclusions.
II. Capital Flows in the World Economy During 1975-1997
In this section I focus on the behavior of capital flows in the world economy during the last two decades. The main objective of this analysis is to unearth regularities, and to detect differences across groups of countries. I consider six groups of countries, that correspond to the IMF's International Financial Statistics classification: (1) Industrial, In Tables 1 through 5 I summarize the behavior of capital flows to these six regions during the period under study. I provide data on averages, medians, standard deviations and coefficients of variation for the volumes of flows relative to GDP. 1 While Table 1 contains data for the complete period, Tables 2 through 4 present data for each category of capital flows -debt, FDI, equities and total flows -for three different subperiods: The first period is 1975-82, and corresponds to the years prior to the debt crisis of 1982. The second subperiod is 1983-89, and corresponds to the years when most emerging countries had difficulties attracting foreign capital. The final subperiod is 1990-97, a period when private capital flew, once again, into the emerging economies. This period also corresponds to the initiation of market-oriented reforms in most regions in the world, including the former communist nations.
Visual inspection of Tables 1 through 5 suggests that capital flows have behaved differently across categories, regions and periods. Flows appear to have been more volatile in the emerging economies and in particular in Africa. These tables also capture the slowdown in flows in the period 1983-89, when most of the emerging world was battling the consequences of the debt crisis, and the resumption of capital flows in the 1990s, including the surge of portfolio flows. It is also apparent from these figures that Africa has been lagging behind other emerging nations in most capital flows categories.
In order to test formally whether capital flows behaved differently across countries, I estimated a series of non parametric Kruskal-Wallis χ 2 tests on the equality of the distribution of capital flows in each of the five emerging market regions and the industrial countries. The null hypothesis is that the data from the industrial nations and from each of the emerging regions have been drawn from the same population. The
Kruskal-Wallis χ 2 test is computed as:
(1)
where n j is the sample size for the j group (j = 1,…m), n is the sum of the n j s, R j is the sum of the ranks j group, and the sum Σ runs from j=1 to j=m.
The results are reported in statistics below the critical value, the overall picture that emerges from Table 6 indicates, quite strongly, that when it comes to capital flows (relative to GDP) to the emerging markets -both as a broad group and as regional aggregates --have indeed been different than capital flows to the industrial nations. capital mobility --including countries that have banned capital movement --, it does not take a long time for the private sector to find ways to get around the restrictions. The most common mechanisms have been the overinvoicing of imports and underinvoicing of exports. The massive volumes of capital flight that took place in Latin America in the wake of the 1982 debt crisis clearly showed that, when faced with the "appropriate" incentives, the public can be extremely creative in finding ways to move capital internationally.
III. Measuring the Extent of Capital Mobility in Emerging and Advanced

Economies
III. 1 Previous Measurement Attempts
Measuring the "true" degree of capital mobility is not easy, and is still subject to considerable debate. In two early studies Harberger (1978 Harberger ( , 1980 argued that the effective degree of integration of capital markets should be measured by the convergence of private rates of return to capital across countries. He used national accounts data for a number of countries --including eleven Latin American countries --to estimate rates of return to private capital, and found out that these were significantly similar. More importantly, he found that these private rates of return were independent of national capital-labor ratios.
Harberger interpreted these findings as supporting the view that capital markets are significantly more integrated than what a simple analysis of legal restrictions would suggest.
In an effort to measure the "true" degree of capital mobility, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) analyzed the behavior of savings and investments in a number of countries. They argue that if there is perfect capital mobility, changes in savings and investments will be uncorrelated in a specific country. Using a data set for 16 OECD countries they found that savings and investment ratios were highly positively correlated, and concluded that these results strongly supported the presumption that long term capital was subject to significant impediments. Frankel (1989) In a series of studies Edwards (1985 Edwards ( , 1988 and Edwards and Khan (1985) argued that time series on domestic and international interest rates could be used to assess the degree of openness of the capital account (see also Montiel 1994 An important limitation of these IMF-based indexes, however, is that they are extremely general and do not distinguish between different intensities of capital restrictions.
Moreover, they fail to distinguish between the type of flow that is being restricted, and they ignore the fact that, as discussed above, legal restrictions are frequently circumvented. For example, according to this IMF-based indicator, Chile, Mexico and Brazil were subject to the same degree of capital controls in 1992-1994. In reality, however, the three cases were extremely different. While in Chile there were restrictions on short-term inflows, Mexico had (for all practical purposes) free capital mobility, and Brazil had in place an arcane array of restrictions. Montiel and Reinhart (1999) 
III.2 A Comparison of Two Alternative Measures of the Extent of Capital Mobility
In this sub-section I analyze of the main properties of two broad measures of capital mobility 3 : (1) An index based on the number of years within a certain period that, according to the IMF, a particular country has not imposed capital controls. This is the type of indicator used by Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferreti (1994) , and by Rodrik (1998) in his study on the relationship between capital controls and economic performance. I call this index NUYCO. A higher value denotes a higher degree of capital controls. And (2) Quinn's (1997) index of capital mobility. This indicator can take values goes from 0 through 4, with increments of 0.5. A higher value of this index denotes a higher degree of capital mobility.
3 I am grateful to Gian Maria Milesi-Ferreti for making his data set available to me.
The Number-of-years-with-controls (NUYCO) Index: I computed this index for three periods 1981-85, 1986-1990 and 1981-90 regressions for emerging countries. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient had the expected sign, but was rather low. Moreover the null hypothesis of both indexes being independent could not be rejected at conventional values.
IV. Capital Mobility and Economic Performance: New Results
In principle, a greater of openness of the capital account can impact on economic performance through two alternative channels. The first, and most obvious one, is through it effect foreign savings, and through them, on aggregate investment. Countries
with a more open capital account will have, in principle, the ability to finance a larger current account deficit, and thus increase the volume of foreign savings. If increases in foreign services are not reflected in a one-to-one decline in domestic savings, aggregate savings will be higher. This will allow for higher investment and, thus, faster growth. higher current account deficits. Whether this, in turn, resulted in higher aggregate investment depends on the extent to which foreign savings crowd out domestic savings and is, ultimately, an empirical issue.
In Edwards (1996) I used a broad cross-country data set to analyze this issue. My results suggested that an increase in the current account deficit -that is, an increase in foreign savings -crowd out private domestic savings partially. The point estimate ranged (in absolute value) from 0.38 to 0.625, depending on the specification used for the regression. These results were confirmed by the direct estimation of investment equations that included the CAPOPEN index of capital mobility as a regressor. These regressions are similar to those estimated by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) , and are not reported here due to space considerations.
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The second (potential) channel through which capital mobility may affect performance refers to efficiency and productivity growth. According to a number of authors, the elimination of capital controls, reduces an important distortion, and will tend to result in higher return to investment, and higher productivity growth. That is, according to this channel, countries with a more open capital account will outperform those with restrictions on capital mobility, even after controlling for the direct investment effect. In this section I use the data described above to investigate the importance of this particular channel.
IV.2 Basic Econometric Results
According to economic theory, countries with fewer distortions will tend to perform better than countries with regulations and distortions that impede the functioning of markets. For some time now, most (but not all) economists have agreed that freer trade in goods and services indeed result in faster growth (Barro, 1995; Edwards 1998) .
In standard models this 'free trade' principle extends to the case of trade in securities, and countries that have fewer restrictions on capital mobility will, with other things given, tend to outperform countries that isolate themselves from global financial markets. This view is clearly exposed by Rogoff (1999, p. real GDP growth, and total factor productivity growth during the 1980s. I rely on
Quinn's index to measure the degree of capital mobility in different countries. The data on GDP growth are taken from Summers and Heston and those on TFP growth are from Edwards (1998) .
From a policy perspective analysts are interested in two related issues: (a) Have countries with a more open capital account performed better -in terms of higher productivity growth and per capita GDP growth --than countries that restrict capital mobility? (b) Have countries that have opened their capital account performed differently than countries that have not done so? As noted, a particular important question is whether there is a "performance effect" over and above the investment effect discussed above. One of the advantages of Quinn's index is that is available at two different periods in time, allowing us to address both of these questions. The analysis presented in this section investigates the relationship between capital account restrictions and economic performance, is based on the estimation of the following two equations:
where g j is average real GDP growth in country j during the 1980s; τ j is the average rate of TFP growth during the 1980s; κ κ κ κ j is a measure of capital account openness in country j, or an indicator of the extent of capital account liberalization between 1973 and 1987; the X j are other variables that affect economic performance; ε j and µ j are heteroskedastic errors with zero mean. The αs and βs are parameters to be estimated.
Following the recent literature on growth and cross country economic performance in the estimation of equation (3) Its coefficient is expected to be positive. And (c) the log of real GDP per capita in 1965, which is take to be a measure of initial economic activity. To the extent that countries real income tends to converge, the coefficient of this variable (GDP65l) is expected to be nagative. In the estimation of equation (3) Equations (2) and (3) were estimated using a number of procedures, including weighted least squares, weighted two stages least squares, SURE, and weighted three stage least squares. In all regressions GDP per capita in 1985 was used as a weight. (2) and (3) using the level of capital account restrictions (CAPOP) as the independent variable. In Table 9 , on the other hand, I present the regression results from the estimation of these two equations using the capital account liberalization index, D_CAPOP, as the independent variable. 8 In both tables the sample includes all countries for which data are available. 8 The basic SURE and three stage least square results are not reported due to space considerations. See, however, the discussion below.
As may be seen, the estimated coefficients of human65, inv80, gdp65l have the expected signs in every regression. Moreover, in the vast majority of the regressions the estimated coefficients for these variables were significant at conventional levels. More important for the subject matter of this paper is that the coefficients of the capital account openness variables are positive in every regression, and significant in all but one of them.
These results suggest that, once controlling for other variables, countries that are more integrated to global financial markets have performed better than countries that have isolated themselves. This is the case both for countries that had a more open capital account and countries that liberalized their capital account.
It is interesting to note that if instead of using Quinn's indexes of capital account restrictions, the more common IMF-based indicator is used, the coefficients become insignificant. For instance, in the WLS estimation of the growth equation, the coefficient of NUYCO is 0.0002 with a t-statistic of 0.657. When this equation was estimated using IV-WLS the coefficient was o.ooo8 and the t-statistic 1.12.
IV.2 Outliers and Measurement Errors
In order to investigate the robustness of these results, I performed a sensitivity analysis: I checked for the possible undue influence of outliers, and I dealt with measurement error. 
Errors in Variables:
Even though Quinn's indicators of capital account restrictions are vastly superior that the more traditional ones -including the IMF-based indexes used by Rodrik (1998) and others --, they are still an imperfect measure of the "true" degree of capital mobility. In that sense, the estimation of equations (2) and (3) are subject to a classical error-in-variables problem. The traditional, textbook solution to this problem is to estimate the equation en question using instrumental variables. If the "mis-measured" variable is properly instrumented, the estimated coefficient is consistent.
In that sense, then, it is possible to argue that since the results reported above were obtained with instrumental variables, the measurement problem has been properly tackled.
In the current case, however, the extent of measurement error is likely to be more severe than the simple textbook case. Indeed in this case all independent variables are (possibly) measured with error. Klepper and Leamer (1984) have shown that when measurement error is generalized, it is possible to use a set of reversed regressions to compute bounds for the coefficients of interest. These authors show that if there are no changes in the pattern of coefficient signs when estimating the reversed regressions, the "true" value of each coefficient will be bounded by the minimum and maximum estimates from the set of reversed and direct regressions. If, on the other hand, there is a change in the sign pattern of any of the coefficients, it is necessary to bring in additional information to be able to bound the coefficients.
Following Klepper and Leamer (1984) I estimated the reversed regressions corresponding to equations (2) and (3), and analyzed the sign pattern of the coefficients.
Unfortunately, in each equation there were two sign changes, indicating that it is not straightforward to bound the "true" coefficients. This suggests that the estimates reported above are (somewhat) fragile. In order to address this issue further, I estimated the critical minimal level for the R 2 between the dependent and the "true" (error free) explanatory variable, that is consistent with a coefficients vector bounded by the original orthant. For the TFP equation on capital account liberalization, this minimum value, or R m 2 , is 0.57. This critical value is not completely unreasonable, indicating that, although the estimated equations (2) and (3) are fragile -in the sense that the reversed regression coefficients exhibit a sign switch --, it is possible to assume that their "true" values correspond to those obtained in the direct regressions. In that sense, then, this analysis provides some further support for the finding that, at least for the period under consideration counties with a greater degree of integration with the rest of the world performed better than more isolated nations.
IV.3 How Different are Emerging Countries?
As pointed out in section I of this paper, one of the most important policy questions -and one that is at the heart of recent debates on globalization -is whether the effects of globalization on economic performance is similar in advanced and in emerging economies. In fact, according to many intellectually prominent global skeptics, capital account liberalization is not bad per se,. The problem, in their view, is that the emerging countries are unprepared for it. The problem is, according to this view, that the poor nations do not have the required institutions to handle efficiently large movements of capital. In this subsection I provide some preliminary results that address this issue. Due to space considerations I concentrate on the case when the degree of capital account openness is used as the independent variable. More specifically, I investigate whether the effect of capital restrictions on growth depends on the country's level of development. I do this by adding the interactive independent variable (log GDPC * CAPOP) in the estimation of equations (2) and (3). GDPC is GDP per capita in 1980. In this case, equation (2) becomes:
(2') g j = α 0 + α 1 CAPOP j + α 2 (CAPOP j log GDPC j ) + α 3 human65 j + + α 14 log GDPC65 j + ε j .
If coefficient α 2 is significant, the the total effect of capital openness on growth becomes country-specific, and will be given by:
If α 2 is positive (negative), the effect of capital account openness on growth increases (declines) with the level of development. Table 10 contains the results obtained from the three stages least squares estimation of equations (2) and (3), with an added interactive regressor. As may be seen, all the coefficients are significant at conventional levels. 
V. Conclusions
Although this analysis is preliminary, the results reported in this paper suggests, Number of obs = 58: F( 3, 54) = 6.84; R-squared = 0.1758 * Instruments: human6 gdp65 qcap7 lly70 inv80 open80 dist lly75 bmp75l ** Instruments: human6 gdp65 qcap7 lly70 open80 dist lly75 bmp75l Number of obs = 60; F( 3, 56) = 9.24; R-squared = 0.3311 * The following instruments were used: (human65 gdp65l inv80 qcap58 qopen58 qopen73 qcap73 lly75 dist) ** Instruments: human6 gdp65 qcap7 lly70 open80 dist lly75 bmp75l) ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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